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ABSTRACT The growth of peer-to-peer sharing is crucially dependent on continued participa-
tion of current platform members and on them behaving prosocially towards other participants 
who are usually strangers. We propose a relational-models view that revolves around the idea 
that how members perceive the relationships among participants on a sharing platform signifi-
cantly affects these behavioural outcomes. We test this idea with a survey where we capture 
participants’ perceptions of sharing relationships using Fiske’s (1991) relational models ‒ com-
munal sharing, market pricing, and equality matching. We show that communal sharing and 
equality matching foster prosocial behaviour (which we label sharing citizenship behaviour) 
and the willingness to continue participating, whereas market pricing does not have the nega-
tive effects we expected. Our work advances relational models theory in addition to contribut-
ing to the literature on the sharing economy.
Keywords: peer-to-peer sharing, relational value, sharing citizenship behaviour, sharing 
economy, willingness to participate
INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer sharing refers to ‘consumers granting each other temporary access to under- 
utilized physical assets (“idle capacity”), possibly for money’ (Frenken and Schor, 
2017, pp. 4–5). The growth of the sharing economy is closely tied to the upscaling of 
peer-to-peer sharing for two reasons. First, peer-to-peer sharing represents a large and 
rapidly growing part of the sharing economy. Assessing the size of the sharing economy 
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through five key peer-to-peer sectors, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016a) found that in 
2015 they produced revenues of almost 4 billion Euro in Europe and enabled approxi-
mately 28 billion Euro of transactions, with an expected 20-fold increase to 570 billion 
Euro by 2025 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016b). Second, scholars have claimed that 
sharing between individuals embodies the original principles of the sharing economy 
(Frenken and Schor, 2017; Muñoz and Cohen, 2017; Murillo et al., 2017), since it allows 
to create a sense of community and social bonding (Benjaafar et al., 2019), it enables the 
empowerment of ordinary people (Murillo et al., 2017), and it helps tackle overproduc-
tion through the exploitation of under-utilized assets (Benjaafar et al., 2019). Therefore, 
in order to keep true to the fundamental tenets of the sharing economy, its growth 
should be fuelled in primis by the expansion of sharing among peers.
The growth of  peer-to-peer sharing is, however, not a given. Compared to scaling up 
sharing by companies (e.g., Zipcar and Rent the Runway), scaling up peer-to-peer shar-
ing requires overcoming the sizeable challenge posed by sharing with strangers. Sharing 
with strangers could make providers and users on peer-to-peer sharing platforms much 
more reluctant to share than they would be if  the other party was a company, because 
they feel much more vulnerable to being taken advantage of  by the other party (Schor 
and Fitzmaurice, 2015). What if  a renter of  our car does not treat it as we would, or, 
worse still, what if  they actually deliberately cause damage or steal (Brunning, 2015; 
Möhlmann, 2016)? What if  the meal we buy from a peer has been prepared in an unhy-
gienic manner and makes us sick? Irresponsible behaviour and reluctance to share with 
strangers could threaten the growth of  peer-to-peer sharing.
In order to investigate this potential threat, we depart from the well-established idea 
in social psychology that, when we feel dependent on strangers, our behaviour is very 
sensitive to our perceptions of  what the situation is ‘about’, which shape our expectations 
about others’ behaviour (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). We therefore expect that pro-
viders’ and users’ perceptions of  the nature of  the relationships among participants on a 
peer-to-peer sharing platform ‒ including what motivates participants and what is nor-
matively appropriate conduct on this platform ‒ matter a lot to explain the behavioural 
outcomes crucial for the future of  the sharing economy. To capture the nature of  the 
relationships among participants, we build on Fiske’s (1991, 1992) relational models 
theory. This theory has already been applied successfully in management research and 
presents the advantage of  offering a richer conceptualization than the existing literature 
on peer-to-peer sharing platforms, while still being parsimonious. Specifically, we pro-
pose that participants can frame relationships among peers using three relational models: 
communal sharing (where belonging to the same community guides behaviour), equality 
matching (where balanced reciprocity guides behaviour), and market pricing (where a 
cost-benefit analysis guides behaviour).
Testing our ideas on a sample of  975 participants of  four peer-to-peer sharing plat-
forms, we found support for our general idea that stronger communal sharing and equal-
ity matching framing will positively affect two behavioural outcomes that are important 
for the sustainability of  peer-to-peer sharing: (1) providers’ and users’ behaviour that 
reflects a heightened sense of  responsibility towards other sharing participants, which we 
label ‘sharing citizenship behaviour’ (a concept that turned out to have two dimensions: 
‘altruism’ and ‘conscientiousness’), and (2) their willingness to continue sharing on the 
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platform. In contrast to what we hypothesized, we did not find communal sharing to 
have a systematically stronger positive impact than equality matching. Instead, equal-
ity matching exhibited a stronger relationship with conscientiousness and willingness to 
continue participating than communal sharing. Furthermore, we found the hypothesized 
negative impact of  a stronger market pricing frame on willingness to continue participat-
ing, but not on the two dimensions of  sharing citizenship behaviour. This is surprising 
given the repeated arguments across many bodies of  literature that economic incentives 
often undermine morality (e.g., Bowles, 2008; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).
Our work contributes to the literature on peer-to-peer sharing and to relational models 
theory. For the literature on peer-to-peer sharing, our relational-models view empha-
sizes the importance of  the mental framing of  the relationships among participants to 
explain sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue participating on peer-
to-peer sharing platforms. For the growth of  the sharing economy, our findings suggest 
that sharing platforms could promote peer-to-peer sharing by developing features that 
prompt participants to frame their relationships more strongly in communal sharing or 
equality matching terms. For relational models theory, our work delivers one of  the very 
first empirical tests of  the theory in the management field. While our empirical results 
confirm the interest of  using this theory to understand management-related phenomena, 
they also reveal the need to theorize about the effects of  the relational models at a more 
fine-grained level: the ranking proposed by Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016) turned out not 
to be generalizable to all types of  cooperative behaviour.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Peer-to-Peer Sharing: A Need to Look at Relationships
Whilst research on peer-to-peer sharing platforms is still scarce, analogies have been 
drawn with platforms that have received wider scholarly attention. In particular, the 
peer-to-peer sharing platforms have been conceptualized (Kyprianou, 2018; Zervas 
et al., 2017) as a kind of ‘two-sided markets’ (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006) or ‘platform 
markets’ (Rietveld and Eggers, 2018) because these platforms are intermediaries that 
enable interactions between at least two sets of actors (providers and users), they do not 
take ownership of the goods transferred (Frenken and Schor, 2017), and they are charac-
terized by indirect network effects (i.e., the value of the platform for each side depends on 
the number of actors on the other side) (Dreyer et al., 2017; Murillo et al., 2017).
Industrial economists have pioneered the study of  platform markets (McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017; Thomas et al., 2014), focusing in particular on the impact of  network 
effects on the competition among platforms and on platforms’ pricing decisions (e.g., 
Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). Over the last years, 
management scholars have also paid increasing attention to platform markets. However, 
to date, research on peer-to-peer platform markets has mostly focused on peer-to-peer 
e-commerce. In this realm, scholars have contributed to our understanding of: (1) par-
ticipants’ strategies (Brough and Isaac, 2012; Reynolds et al., 2009) and reputation 
within a platform (Cheema, 2008; Obloj and Capron, 2011), as well as (2) the effects, 
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on participants’ behaviour, trust, and performance, of  platform strategies and design 
features (Dinerstein et al., 2018; Li et al., 2009), in particular reputation and regulation 
mechanisms (Hui et al., 2016; Kuwabara, 2015).
Peer-to-peer e-commerce shares similarities with peer-to-peer sharing that makes the 
literature on the former relevant to research on the latter. In particular, peer-to-peer 
e-commerce and sharing have in common that the platform provider facilitates connec-
tions between individuals who are strangers to each other (Schor, 2014). Exchanging 
with strangers is likely to be perceived as riskier by (potential) participants than transact-
ing with business organizations as in the case of  business-to-consumer platforms (Einav 
et al., 2016; Jones and Leonard, 2008; Kuwabara, 2015). Yet, peer-to-peer sharing also 
differs fundamentally from peer-to-peer e-commerce in at least two respects, which justi-
fies the need for studies dedicated to peer-to-peer sharing in general, and dedicated to the 
relationships among participants on peer-to-peer sharing platforms in particular.
First, while economic value is always at the heart of  peer-to-peer e-commerce, the 
value peer-to-peer sharing platforms aim to realize for their members usually includes 
a non-monetary component and is sometimes exclusively non-monetary (Acquier et al., 
2017). The extent to which peer-to-peer exchanges are monetized varies across peer-
to-peer sharing platforms and economic value can be completely absent (Frenken and 
Schor, 2017; Habibi et al., 2016), as illustrated by platforms such as Couchsurfing or 
Peerby, where providers give access to their possessions for free (respectively their house 
and their household goods). Furthermore, peer-to-peer sharing is often presented as a 
tool to generate new forms of  solidarity and social bonding among individuals (Belk, 
2010). Assuming that (at least some) individuals seek non-monetary value from their 
participation on peer-to-peer sharing platforms, we can expect the nature of  the relation-
ships among participants to matter because, according to their nature, relationships fulfil 
different relational needs and therefore deliver more or less relational value (Fiske, 2002).
Second, in contrast to e-commerce, peer-to-peer sharing does not generally encompass 
transferring permanently the ownership of  a good (Jiang and Tian, 2018), but instead 
‘granting temporary access to under-utilized physical assets’ (Frenken and Schor, 2017, 
pp. 4–5).1  While buyer-seller interactions usually begin and end with the supply of  the 
product in exchange of  money, peer-to-peer sharing initiates when the provider gives the 
user access to his/her possession, it permeates the use of  the shared good by the user, and 
terminates when the good is returned to the provider. Given the higher complexity and 
duration of  relationships in peer-to-peer sharing compared to peer-to-peer e-commerce, 
the extent to which participants feel vulnerable to other participants’ opportunism and 
misbehaviour is likely to be much higher (Huurne et al., 2017; Schaefers Wittkowski 
et al., 2016). In addition, whereas it is the buyer who copes with the higher risk when 
transferring ownership, opportunism and misbehaviour can take many more forms and 
affect both sides of  the exchange when granting access. For example, on the peer-to-peer 
car sharing platform Turo, owners are vulnerable to renters damaging or destroying their 
car, while renters are vulnerable to car owners providing an unsafe vehicle or cashing in 
money for a car that is actually not available upon the renter’s arrival.
Because of  the vulnerability to other participants’ opportunism and misbehaviour 
and because of  the desire of  (some) participants to obtain relational value, how partic-
ipants perceive sharing relationships on the platform is likely to be an important driver 
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of  participants’ behaviour. It is well established in social psychology that when humans 
feel dependent on others, they tend to ‘dedicate considerable effort to understand what 
the situation is ‘about’ and to developing expectancies about [the other’s] probable be-
havior’ (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003, p. 355). This aspect has so far been overlooked 
by the literature on peer-to-peer sharing platforms, which has focused to date essentially 
on individual motivations to share (e.g., Böcker and Meelen, 2017; Habibi et al., 2016; 
Wilhelms et al., 2017), on platforms’ business models and design features (e.g., Habibi 
et al., 2016; Muñoz and Cohen, 2017), and on the environmental, social or economic 
impacts of  these factors (e.g., Benjaafar et al., 2019; Frenken and Schor, 2017; Jiang and 
Tian, 2018; Zervas et al., 2017).
Our study thus aims to expand the understanding of  peer-to-peer sharing by investi-
gating how individuals’ mental representation of  the relationships among participants 
on the sharing platform affects behaviour that is important for the future of  peer-to-peer 
sharing, namely sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue sharing on 
the platform. If  participants on a sharing platform exhibit a high sense of  responsibil-
ity throughout the sharing exchanges and are willing to take part again in peer-to-peer 
sharing, it increases the odds that the platform will be able to grow while maintaining the 
balance between supply and demand over time.
A Relational-Models View of Peer-to-Peer Sharing
In order to capture how participants perceive relationships on a peer-to-peer sharing 
platform, we use Fiske’s relational models theory (Fiske, 1991, 1992; Haslam, 2004; 
Rai and Fiske, 2011). Disciplines as diverse as psychology, economics, political science, 
sociology, anthropology, and biology have studied why and to what extent people coop-
erate in social interactions, given the temptation to free-ride and the fear of being taken 
advantage of (Van Lange et al., 2013). A key message from this large body of research is 
that humans have developed mental structures to deal with the tension between collec-
tive and individual interests in social interactions (Fiske, 1991). These mental structures, 
which we call relational models in line with relational models theory (Fiske, 1991, 1992; 
Haslam, 2004), are ‘representations, grammars, or script-like social schemata’ (Fiske, 
1991, p. 21) that enable people to internalize relationships as part of their cognitive 
functioning and translate them into behaviour (see Haslam and Ellemers, 2005; Turner 
et al., 1994).
People use these relational models (consciously or unconsciously) ‘to plan and to gen-
erate their own action, to understand, remember, and anticipate others’ action, to co-
ordinate the joint production of  collective action and institutions, and to evaluate their 
own and others’ actions’ (Fiske, 2004, p. 3). The relational models are not exclusively 
cognitive, they also comprise needs, motives, evaluative attitudes and judgments, as well 
as emotions (Fiske, 1991). The relational models trigger different behaviours in social 
interactions because they (a) involve different perceptions of  who one is in relation to the 
partner, (b) are associated with different motives, and, therefore, (c) lead to different rules 
of  appropriate behaviour for oneself  and the partner (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). 
In other words, each of  the relational models conveys distinct expectations regarding 
the relational norms governing a relationship, which in turn evoke distinct actions and 
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responses in relational partners (Bowles and Polonia-Reyes, 2012). Actions that are inap-
propriate according to a relational model are evaluated as immoral by individuals using 
that model and generate negative moral emotions such as guilt, shame, disgust, or out-
rage (Rai and Fiske, 2011). These negative moral emotions motivate individuals to both 
exhibit the behaviour that is appropriate according to the relational model and discipline 
others into behaving appropriately even if  disciplining comes at a personal cost (Gintis 
et al., 2008; Turillo et al., 2002).
On the basis of  an exhaustive review of  the major work on social relationships in 
sociology, social anthropology, and social psychology, Fiske (1991) has argued that we 
employ four elementary relational models to coordinate nearly all our social interactions: 
communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking. While the 
non-hierarchical nature of  peer-to-peer relationships makes it unlikely that participants 
would perceive authority ranking2  to govern these relationships, the other three models 
could apply to peer-to-peer relationships.
Communal sharing (CS) has a lot in common with, inter alia, Ouchi’s (1980) clan, 
Adler’s (2001) community, Gittell’s relational coordination (Gittell and Douglas, 2012), 
and Clark and Mills’ (1979) communal relationship. ‘Communal sharing is a relation 
of  unity, community, undifferentiated collective identity, and kindness, typically enacted 
among close kin’ (Fiske, 1991, p. ix). The fusion of  the self  with the community charac-
terizing CS means that individuals see themselves and other members of  the community 
as equivalent, undifferentiated, and sharing the same goal to promote the community’s 
interests (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). As a result, CS calls for generalized reciprocity – 
a norm according to which no one keeps track of  how much is given and received (Fiske, 
1991) – and individuals contribute altruistically to the common objective, regardless of  
personal rewards and costs (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). Belk (2014, p. 16) classifies 
this form of  sharing as ‘sharing in’, because actors incorporate those with whom they 
share as ‘aggregate extended self ’.
Market pricing (MP) corresponds to the traditional economic view of  transactions 
and is similar to, for example, Williamson’s (1975) concept of  market, and Clark and 
Mills’ (1979) exchange relationship. ‘Market pricing is based on an (intermodal) metric 
of  value by which people compare different commodities and calculate exchange and 
cost/benefit ratios’ (Fiske, 1991, p. ix). MP makes personal identities salient, with indi-
viduals seeing themselves as independent entities competing for achievement (Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst, 2016). This makes the pursuit of  self-interest the norm (Fiske, 1991). 
This type of  relationships is closely linked to Belk’s (2014) ‘sharing out’ because it is not 
about helping others or making human connections, but rather about maximizing one’s 
own profit.
Compared to the other models, Equality matching (EM) has received little attention 
in management research (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). It is therefore not surprising 
that it has not yet been explicitly considered in the literature on the sharing economy. 
‘Equality matching is a one-to-one correspondence relationship in which people are dis-
tinct but equal, as manifested in balanced reciprocity (or tit-for-tat: revenge), equal share 
distributions or identical contributions, in-kind replacement compensation, and turn tak-
ing’ (Fiske, 1991, p. ix). In relationships framed as EM, individuals’ identity stretches to 
include the relational partners’ well-being, at least as long as the partners are perceived 
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to be cooperative (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). From this relational identity follows a 
norm of  balanced reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972), whereby people are expected to take turns 
and strive for balance in what is given and received and ensure that any help is returned, 
usually in kind (Fiske, 1991).3  This model of  balanced exchange typically regulates rela-
tionships with neighbours and more distant friends.
We have three reasons for working with the relational models – CS, MP, and EM – to 
explain participants’ behaviour on peer-to-peer sharing platforms. First, while still parsi-
monious, relational models theory offers a more complete set of  mental representations 
of  sharing relationships than the traditional dichotomies applied in studies of  the sharing 
economy. As critics have already acknowledged (e.g., Arnould and Rose, 2016; Bucher 
et al., 2016), participants’ motivations to engage in sharing relationships are often over-
simplified: participants are often assumed to be driven either by purely altruistic motiva-
tions or solely by economic considerations. With the balanced reciprocity at the core of  
the equality matching model, relational models theory offers a second alternative to the 
pure economic self-interest characterizing market pricing, next to the altruism coming 
from a common identity in the communal sharing model. Second, empirical research 
pitting relational models theory against alternative perspectives on social relationships 
showed that relational models theory fared better in depicting real-life relationships than 
Foa and Foa’s theory of  resource exchange, Parsons’ theory of  role expectations, Mills 
and Clark’s theory of  communal and exchange relationships, and MacCrimmon and 
Messick’s theory of  social motives or orientations (Haslam, 1995; Haslam and Fiske, 
1992). Third, Fiske’s relational models theory has already been successfully used in 
the management field to explain relationships between individuals (e.g., Bridoux and 
Stoelhorst, 2016; Giessner and van Quaquebeke, 2010; Mossholder et al., 2011).
While the relational models have often been used to capture how individuals perceive 
their relationship with a specific partner, we apply the models to grasp how individuals 
perceive relationships among participants on peer-to-peer sharing platforms in general. 
This is in line with Mossholder et al. (2011), who used the models to capture relational 
climates in organizations, which they define as ‘sociocognitive environments that […] 
support conceptually distinct forms of  interpersonal relationships among employees’ 
(Mossholder et al., 2011, p. 34). Specifically, we are interested in how individuals see (a) 
who participants are in relation to other participants on the sharing platform, (b) what 
motivates participants, and (c) what are appropriate behaviours on the sharing platform. 
We chose this conceptualization because individuals are likely to fall back on more ge-
neric mental frames in interacting with strangers, for whom they have no history of  
personal interactions from which to derive specific mental representations. Similar ar-
guments have been made regarding the role of  organizational climate in guiding em-
ployees’ prosocial behaviour (e.g., helping, knowledge sharing) towards other employees 
who are strangers or distant acquaintances (Bock et al., 2005; Constant et al., 1996). As 
it would be the case among employees working closely together, we acknowledge that, 
in case of  repeated dyadic interactions, participants on a sharing platform will over time 
gather enough information to choose the relational model that matches that specific 
relationship and may no longer rely on the more generic mental representations of  how 
participants generally relate to each other. This implies that, with our conceptualization 
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of  the relational models, repeated dyadic interactions fall outside of  the scope of  our 
study (we come back to this limitation in the discussion).
Furthermore, we expect that participants may employ a combination of  the three 
relational models to mentally represent how peers generally relate to each other on the 
platform, whereas the management literature has often approached relational models 
as substitutes (e.g., Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016; Sheppard and Sherman, 1998), ar-
guing that an individual can only hold one relational frame at one point in time, even 
if  relational models can follow one another relatively quickly in an individual’s mind in 
response to changes in the social interaction or the environment (Fiske, 1991, 1992). Yet, 
in their empirical study, Haslam and Fiske (1999) show that relational models can co- 
exist. Accordingly, Haslam and Fiske (1999, p. 242) have argued that social relationships 
may be ‘governed by combinations of  the models’, which ‘are not, therefore, empirically 
independent in principle’. Individuals may concurrently adopt different relational mod-
els to address ‘different aspects of  different social-relational interactions’ (Rai and Fiske, 
2011, p. 60).
In the rest of  this section, we formulate hypotheses regarding the comparative impact 
of  the relational models on participants’ sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to 
continue participating, our two dependent variables.
Behavioural Outcomes of the Relational Models
Sharing behaviour that shows a high sense of responsibility towards other participants 
is essential for the growth of peer-to-peer sharing, as it fosters satisfaction with par-
ticipation and positive emotional responses to sharing, which are crucial to long-term 
success (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012; Habibi et al., 2017; Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015). 
Specifically, this type of prosocial behaviour has been argued to create positive emo-
tions, such as feelings of gratitude, happiness and bonding, that motivate users and pro-
viders alike to seek out additional sharing experiences and remain committed over time 
(Bucher et al., 2016; Habibi et al., 2017; Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015). Scholars studying 
the sharing economy have provided multiple examples of this type of behaviour, e.g., 
additional services, small acts of hospitality, and consumer cocreation (e.g., Bardhi and 
Eckhardt, 2012; Belk, 2010; Habibi et al., 2016, Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015).
We see clear parallels between these many examples and what the human resource lit-
erature calls ‘organizational citizenship behaviour’ (OCB), which refers to specific forms 
of  extra-role behaviour beneficial for the organization or co-workers (Podsakoff  et al., 
2000). We, therefore, chose the label sharing citizenship behaviour to designate sharing be-
haviour that shows a high sense of  responsibility towards other participants. We built 
on the extensive literature on OCB to conceptualize sharing citizenship behaviour, a 
necessary step in order to measure the concept adequately (see Podsakoff  et al., 2016). 
Specifically, we conceptualize sharing citizenship behaviour as encompassing two cat-
egories of  behaviour. First, the literature describes sharing behaviour that is similar to 
‘altruism’, a form of  OCB that involves helping co-workers without expecting an extrin-
sic reward for this behaviour (Organ, 1997). For example, Airbnb hosts often engage 
in additional services, such as offering some food to their guests and giving additional 
advice and local recommendations; similarly, guests have been known to bring gifts and 
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express gratitude to their hosts (Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015). The second category of  
sharing citizenship behaviour is very close to the ‘conscientiousness’ dimension of  OCB. 
‘[A]kin to compliance with internalized norms defining what a “good employee ought 
to do”’ (Smith et al., 1983, p. 657), Couchsurfer participants expressed an expectation 
of  punctuality, cleanliness, and willingness to spend time with the host and exchange 
experiences, while rejecting the idea that their partners ‘owed’ anything to them or vice 
versa Harvey et al. (2014).
We hypothesize that how individuals perceive the relationships among participants on 
a peer-to-peer sharing platform affects the extent to which they exhibit sharing citizen-
ship behaviour. Research in management has already linked Fiske’s relational models to 
other forms of  prosocial behaviour such as helping co-workers (Mossholder et al., 2011), 
knowledge sharing (Boer et al., 2011), and cooperation among stakeholders (Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst, 2016). The gist of  this work is that behaviour depends on the individual’s 
perception of  the situation, i.e. on the answer he/she gives to the question ‘What kind 
of  situation is this?’ (Messick, 1999; Weber et al., 2004). Individuals rely on relational 
schemas to answer this question (Blatt, 2009) and identify which kind of  behaviour is 
appropriate in that specific context (Weber et al., 2004).
Following what Mossholder et al. (2011) have argued for helping co-workers and what 
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016) have argued for cooperation among stakeholders, we ex-
pect sharing citizenship behaviour to be most strongly positively affected by CS, followed 
by EM, while we expect a negative effect of  MP. A CS frame has the largest positive 
impact because it brings individuals to identify with the collective and to expect other 
participants to similarly see themselves as community members (Fiske, 1991, p. 1992). 
As a result of  the inclusion of  other participants within a common social boundary, indi-
viduals perceive lower social distance among participants than in the case of  a relational 
identity, which typifies EM, or a personal identity, which characterizes MP (Brewer and 
Gardner, 1996; Brewer and Kramer, 1986). This reduced social distance makes individ-
uals more likely to equate their own and other participants’ welfare (Brewer and Kramer, 
1986) and, thus, more willing to fulfil other participants’ needs because others’ needs are 
very much perceived as one’s own needs (Fiske, 1991). Consequently, the more individu-
als perceive the relationships among participants as CS, the more we can expect them to 
engage in sharing citizenship behaviour with little regard for the personal costs involved 
in order to fulfil other participants’ needs.
By comparison to CS, the positive impact of  EM on sharing citizenship behaviour 
should be smaller. In contrast to the collective identity that characterizes CS, EM is 
typified by a relational identity whereby the partner is seen as equal but different from 
the individual him/herself  (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2016). As a result of  this differ-
ent level of  identification, the norm guiding behaviour is not, like with CS, to contrib-
ute to common objectives regardless of  personal costs and trying to fulfil each other’s 
needs. Instead, the norm is balanced reciprocity according to which the benefits received 
and costs incurred by the parties to the exchange should be in balance (Fiske, 1991, 
1992). Because balance is core, individuals who adopt an EM frame are conditional co- 
operators: they exhibit prosocial behaviour to the same extent as their partner (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). Thus, for example, if  a sharing 
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partner has provided a good in an appropriate state, a participant who sees relationships 
among participants as governed by EM will reciprocate by returning the good in good 
condition. The norm of  balanced reciprocity underlying EM also encourages sharing 
citizenship behaviour because it comes with the expectation that such behaviour will 
be repaid by sharing partners in the future, in the form of  either direct reciprocity (the 
same sharing partner reciprocates in the future) or indirect reciprocity (informed of  the 
individual’s past sharing citizenship behaviour, a future sharing partner reciprocates this 
behaviour). For example, car owners who strongly frame the sharing relationship on the 
platform as EM will likely offer a car in good condition because they expect that the users 
will reciprocate their sharing citizenship behaviour by treating the car well and returning 
it in good condition, thus saving the owner monetary and emotional costs.
Conversely, we posit that the more participants perceive the sharing relationship to 
be governed by MP, the less likely they are to exhibit sharing citizenship behaviour. In 
MP relationships, people ‘reduce all relevant features and components of  the relation-
ship into a single value or utility metric’ (Giessner and Van Quaquebeke, 2010, p. 46), 
which is likely to be money when exchanges are monetized. The self-interested pursuit 
of  material benefits is therefore the norm for both one’s own and other participants’ be-
haviour (Fiske, 1991). Extant management literature has shown how triggering a business 
decision frame leads to unethical actions (Kouchaki et al., 2013) and less cooperation 
(Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999) compared to a community frame. In a sharing economy 
context, when sharing is equated with money this ‘effectively mov[es] the transaction out 
of  the realm of  the social and into the realm of  business’ (Belk, 2014, p. 12). The follow-
ing hypothesis sums up our arguments for the comparative impact of  the three relational 
models on sharing citizenship behaviour:
Hypothesis 1: Sharing citizenship behaviour is more positively affected by CS than by 
EM, while it is negatively affected by MP.
A second behavioural outcome that is crucial for the future of  peer-to-peer sharing is 
individuals’ willingness to continue participating. Like for sharing citizenship behaviour, 
we expect that the more participants frame the sharing relationships on the platform as 
CS or EM, the higher their willingness to keep participating, while a stronger MP fram-
ing should lead to a lower willingness to continue sharing on the platform. Furthermore, 
we expect that the positive impact of  CS is larger than the positive impact of  EM. Two 
reasons underlie these expectations.
First, participants derive higher relational value from relationships framed as CS or 
EM than from the ones framed as MP, and higher relational value from relationships 
framed as CS than from the ones framed as EM. Relationships perceived as CS or EM 
provide utility to participants that, besides material benefits, encompasses intangible ben-
efits such as the psychological well-being humans derive from feeling part of  a group 
(CS) or feeling appreciated as a trustworthy partner (EM). The collective identity at the 
core of  CS provides high relational value because it serves many positive functions: (a) a 
group identity offers social self-esteem, which derives from the comparison of  the group 
to which one belongs with other groups, (b) it helps individuals structure their causal 
understanding of  the social environment by reducing a complex social environment to a 
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smaller number of  distinct categories, and (c) it very much simplifies predicting others’ 
actions as other group members can be expected to adopt the prototypical behaviours, 
characteristics, and values associated with the particular group membership (Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
The relational identity characterizing EM also offers relational value to participants 
but less than a collective identity. Through the feeling of  being a valued exchange partner, 
the positive relational identity linked to EM enhances participants’ self-esteem (Dutton et 
al., 2010). Yet, as the unique sense of  self  remains psychologically present (Brewer and 
Gardner, 1996), a relational identity does not provide the benefits for CS listed under (b) 
and (c), namely facilitating participants’ understanding of  the social world and signifi-
cantly increasing predictability in the social world. Regarding predictability specifically, 
while the collective identity and the attached behavioural norm to fulfil others’ needs 
reduce the fear for other participants’ opportunism to a large extent when sharing rela-
tionships are seen as scoring high on CS, such fear does remain salient when participants 
perceive sharing relationships as governed by EM. In contrast to a CS or EM frame, in 
an MP frame, relationships are primarily perceived as means to material ends (Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst, 2016) such as accessing goods for users and making a profit out of  unused 
goods for providers. This means that participants do not derive much value from the 
sharing relationship beyond the utility linked to material benefits.
Second, when participants see themselves and potential sharing partners as members 
of  the same community (CS) or as striving for reciprocity (EM), they will expect partners 
in potential future interactions to also value the sharing relationships themselves and to 
exhibit sharing citizenship behaviour so as to sustain these relationships (Bridoux and 
Stoelhorst, 2016). Expecting that other participants will refrain from misbehaving in turn 
increases participants’ willingness to continue participating on a sharing platform. This 
effect is, however, stronger for CS than for EM because relational value is lower for EM 
compared to CS. In contrast, if  participants characterize sharing relationships as high on 
MP, they expect future sharing relationships to be governed by self-interest. Participants 
may fear that it is likely that they will be the victim of  others’ misbehaviour when it is 
in others’ self-interest to misbehave. On the basis of  the two reasons just explained, we 
propose:
Hypothesis 2: Willingness to continue participating is more positively affected by CS 
than by EM, while it is negatively affected by MP.
METHODOLOGY
Data Gathering and Sample
To investigate whether perceptions of relationships among peers help explain partici-
pants’ sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue participating, we sur-
veyed active participants based in the Netherlands of four sharing platforms: Peerby, 
PeerbyGo, Snappcar, and Thuisafgehaald. Peerby started in Amsterdam in 2012 as a 
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sharing platform for household items that offered its members to share household items 
for free. In 2016, the organization behind Peerby also launched PeerbyGo, a sharing 
platform where transactions are paid for. Peerby.com is now active in most European 
cities, counts approximately 450,000 members, and has $1 billion worth of items in its 
database. The two services have separate websites. Another notable difference between 
the two services is that Peerby is request-based: peers post requests to which others in 
their neighbourhood can respond (peerby.com) and the requestee personally picks up 
the requested product at their neighbours’ house. In contrast, on PeerbyGo only provid-
ers create an account on the website, in which they list the products they offer, their daily 
rental price, and as an additional service all rented items are insured through Peerby 
Guarantee. Providers deliver the products at the renters’ house. The most popular prod-
ucts are the same on the two platforms and include: power drills, ladders, projectors, 
party tents, and pressure cleaners (European Commission, 2017).
The third platform, Snappcar, is the European leader in peer-to-peer car rental. Also 
referred to as the ‘Airbnb for cars’, Snappcar currently lists 41,000 cars in the Netherlands 
and is expanding rapidly in the rest of  Europe. Similar to the PeerbyGo model, providers 
offer their cars on the website. Unlike Peerby however, users are vetted by the platform 
(Boztas, 2017). Once users have completed their registration, they can rent cars by send-
ing a request to registered owners. Once the request is accepted, the user will have to pay 
for the transaction, after which the request is finalized. The final step is for the renter and 
provider to agree on a pick-up and drop-off  location on the agreed-upon time and date, 
which also includes exchange of  keys in person.
Finally, Thuisafgehaald is a community of  more than 55,000 home cooks who share 
their meals with their neighbours throughout the Netherlands. Cooks list available meals 
and the number of  portions on the site. Once users have registered, they can ‘reserve’ 
these meals and pick them up at the cook’s house at the agreed-upon time. In Table I, we 
report additional information for each of  the four platforms as well as some key figures.
In September 2016 the four sharing platforms invited their members to take part in a 
national survey focused on the sharing economy via an e-mail which contained a direct 
link to our online questionnaire. Participants did not receive a financial compensation 
for their participation, but an iPad could be won via a raffle, to further incentivize their 
participation. All the participating platforms regularly carry out their own online surveys, 
for which they typically invite a random sample of  their members. Accordingly, we asked 
the platforms to randomize the selection of  their members that we would survey so as to 
draw a representative sample of  their participants. Inspection of  our sampled respon-
dents backs up the representativeness of  our sample. For each of  the four platforms, 
we have respondents from all income and education levels as well as from each cate-
gory of  participants, namely providers, users, and prosumers (cf. our control variables 
below). Furthermore, from a geographical standpoint, the respondents came from all 
12 provinces in the Netherlands ‒ Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland, 
Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg 
‒ and covered 138 different municipalities, with, as expected, most respondents in our 
dataset located in the three most populated provinces ‒ i.e., Utrecht, Noord-Holland, 
and Zuid-Holland. In total, we collected 1,520 questionnaires. Of  our respondents, 813 
were users of  Peerby, 317 of  PeerbyGo, 153 of  Snappcar, and 237 of  Thuisafgehaald.
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Among the sampled respondents, 59 percent were female and 41 percent male. 44 
percent of  respondents had a university degree and 41 percent of  respondents enjoyed 
a professional education, while only 15 percent of  respondents were lower educated. 
21 percent of  our respondents fell into a lower-income category (up to 1,500 Euro per 
month), 45 percent enjoyed a medium income (between 1,501 and 3,500 Euro per 
month) and 26 percent a gross monthly income of  3,501 Euro or more. The average 
age was 45.21 (SD = 12.47). It was impossible to use all the observations gathered as 
several respondents only completed a portion of  the survey. In the additional analysis 
subsection, we describe the steps we took to account for this as a potential source of  bias. 
After having excluded incomplete surveys, the final working sample used for the analyses 
comprised 975 observations.
Measures
Our first dependent variable, sharing citizenship behaviour, was measured with 11 items (for 
an overview of all measures see Table II). We stayed as close as possible to the existing 
organizational citizenship scales (Lee and Allen, 2002; McNeely and Meglino, 1994; 
Podsakoff et al., 1990; Williams and Anderson, 1991). The preliminary instrument was 
reviewed by experts in the field and afterwards pilot-tested amongst 78 respondents. On 
the basis of these insights some of the items were dropped or modified. This resulted in 
a scale of 10 items of which 8 were kept in the final model (Cronbach α = 0.73). They 
closely resembled the dimensions ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘altruism’ of OCB (e.g., Organ, 
1997; Podsakoff et al., 1990). For example, respondents were asked to what extent they 
‘obey platform rules and regulations even when no one is watching’ and ‘help other 
members, with any additional questions they might have, during my own time’ (7-point 
scales; 1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). Our second dependent variable, 
willingness to continue participating, was measured with three items that we adapted from 
Hamari et al. (2016). For example, we used the item ‘all things considered, I expect 
to continue using [Platform X] in the future’ (7-point scale; 1 = completely disagree; 
7 = completely agree; Cronbach α = 0.66).
We also asked respondents to rate the interactions among the members of  the sharing 
platform on the relational models communal sharing (CS), equality matching (EM), and market 
pricing (MP). The three relational models were measured using 4-item scales each, that 
we adapted from Haslam and Fiske (1999) to apply to a group setting (7-point scale; 
1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). An item for CS is, for example, ‘Members 
of  [Platform X] form a community: they belong together’ (Cronbach α = 0.65, after de-
leting item 1). EM is captured with items like: ‘on [Platform X] members have the same 
opportunities and obligations’ (Cronbach α = 0.67, after deleting item 1) and a represen-
tative item for MP is: ‘group members have a right to a fair rate of  return in proportion 
to what they have paid or contributed’ (Cronbach α = 0.66, after deleting item 1).
We controlled for a variety of factors in order to account for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity. First, we controlled for several demographic factors, namely gender, age, 
level of education, and income. Previous research on sharing platforms showed that 
low-income groups and older people are more motivated by economic benefits (Böcker 
and Meelen, 2017), whilst women are more socially driven (Hellwig et al., 2015). Hence, 
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our dichotomous variable female scores 1 for females and 0 for males, while age is a 
continuous variable corresponding to the age of respondents. With respect to the ed-
ucation level, we categorized respondents according to three main categories (lower, 
professional, and high) in which high corresponds to a university degree, professional is 
associated to a degree from a professional school, while lower stands for any lower level 
of education. Accordingly, we introduced two dichotomous variables corresponding to 
the education lower and education professional categories. We also accounted for the vary-
ing income levels of respondents by grouping them into three main income categories 
in which low corresponds to a gross monthly salary of up to 1,500 Euro, medium to 
a monthly salary between 1,501 and 3,500 Euro and high to anything beyond 3,501 
Euro. Therefore, we included two dichotomous variables income medium and income high 
in our analyses.
We also controlled for the role of participants on the platform since the perceived 
economic benefits that people get out of sharing might differ according to whether 
participants are providers or users. Even in a non-monetized sharing context, partic-
ipants who ‘borrow’ an item can be economically motivated, as gaining temporary 
access to the good for free is cheaper than renting the good or buying it. Interestingly, 
Peerby has been known to stimulate people to be both providers and users on the plat-
form. Accordingly, we grouped respondents using three categories, namely providers, 
users and prosumers ‒ who correspond to consumers active in both roles (Ritzer and 
Jurgenson, 2010). In our model specification we therefore included two dichotomous 
variables identifying providers and prosumers. Additionally, we included a control vari-
able, economic motivation, that more explicitly identifies the economic motivation driving 
participants. To measure economic motivation, we used the three items related to eco-
nomic benefits from Hamari et al.’s (2016) four-item scale that aims to measure func-
tional benefits (we left out the item about saving time). Respondents were asked to rate 
the extent to which their activity on the platform (a) improved their economic situation, 
(b) saved them money, and (c) gave them a financial advantage (Cronbach α = 0.73). 
We also controlled for the number of years of membership in the given platform at the 
time of the survey (membership), as well as the frequency with which a given respondent 
used the corresponding platform ‒ the variable frequency corresponds to the number 
of engagements every 3 months ‒ as these variables may have an impact on the rela-
tionships under scrutiny. Finally, we included dummies corresponding to the platforms 
considered in our study.
RESULTS
We assessed the validity of our measures using confirmatory factor analysis, by com-
paring our proposed 6-factor model with five alternative nested models merging two 
or more of our six constructs measured with several items (namely, sharing citizenship 
behaviour, willingness to continue participating, communal sharing, equality matching, 
market pricing, and economic motivation) and one alternative model disaggregating 
sharing citizenship behaviour into consciousness and altruism. As reported in Table III, 
model comparisons based on sequential chi-square difference tests and differences in 
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Table II. Constructs and measurement items
Willingness to con-
tinue participating
‘To what extent do you agree with the following statement’
I can see myself participating more frequently in [PLATFORM X] in the 
future
It is likely that I will frequently participate in collaborate consumption com-
munities in the future
All things considered, I expect to continue using [PLATFORM X] in the 
future
Relational models ‘We are interested in your impression of how people interact on [PLATFORM 
X]’
Communal sharing If a member of [PLATFORM X] needs something, someone on [PLATFORM 
X] will give it without expecting anything in returna 
Members of [PLATFORM X] feel a moral obligation to be kind and compas-
sionate to each other
Members of [PLATFORM X] feel that they have something unique in com-
mon with one another that makes you essentially the same
Members of [PLATFORM X] form a community: they belong together
Equality matching On [PLATFORM X] members keep track of what we give to each other, in 
order to keep the relationships balanceda 
Members of [PLATFORM X] consider yourselves peers and fellow members 
and partners of the same platform
On [PLATFORM X] members treat each other equally
On [PLATFORM X] members have the same opportunities and obligations
Market pricing What you get from another member [PLATFORM X] is directly proportional 
to how much you give that membera 
Members of [PLATFORM X] see each other as business partners
Group members have a right to a fair rate of return in proportion to what they 
have paid or contributed
Interactions between members of [PLATFORM X] are strictly rational: they 
make decisions based on the ratio of the benefits they get and the costs to 
them
Sharing citizenship 
behaviour
‘To what extent do you agree with the following statements on how you interact 
on the platform’
Altruism I show personal interest in other members on the platform
I am willing to help other members, with any additional questions they might 
have, during my own time
I will adapt my own schedule to cater to other members
I am always willing to help others on the platform
Conscientiousness I give advance notice if I won’t be able to make it on time for an appointment 
with another member
I abide by the rules and procedures of the platform, even if no one is watching
I am always on time for my appointments with other members
I try to avoid causing trouble for other members
aThis item was dropped because it loaded poorly.
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comparative fit index (CFI) (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002) revealed that the 7-factor 
measurement model was the best fitting model and better fitting than the proposed 
6-factor model. This indicates support for the unidimensionality of our relational mod-
els, but not of sharing citizenship behaviour. Therefore, we split sharing citizenship 
behaviour into two dimensions: conscientiousness and altruism (with Cronbach α equals to 
0.77 and 0.68, respectively). The 7-factor model proved a good fit to the data: χ 2(209) = 
699.55, p < 0.001, square root mean residual (SRMR) = 0.05, CFI = 0.93, root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.05. As this was the best fitting model, 
we pursued our analyses with these two separate dimensions of sharing citizenship be-
haviour. The additional analysis (reported in the Appendix) provides further evidence 
that our measures of the three relational models CS, EM, and MP exhibit adequate 
internal consistency, as well as convergent and discriminant validity.
Table IV contains the descriptive statistics and the pairwise correlations between the 
variables. We inspected the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) to assess potential multicol-
linearity. The VIFs values are all well below the strictest limit of  5.3 recommended by 
Hair et al. (2006). Therefore, we do not expect issues of  multicollinearity to impact our 
results.
Main Analyses
Our hypotheses call for the estimation of how the three relational models CS, EM, and 
MP relate to conscientiousness, altruism, and willingness to continue participating. Our unit of 
Table III. Fit indices for alternative measurement models
Measurement Model χ 
2 (df) Δ χ 2 (df) CFI SRMS RMSEA PClose
Proposed model:
Six factorsa 1255.38 (215) ‒ 0.86 0.06 0.06 0.00
Alternative models:
Five factorsb 1388.51 (220) 133.13*** (5) 0.85 0.06 0.07 0.00
Four factorsc 1725.53 (224) 470.15*** (9) 0.80 0.07 0.08 0.00
Three factorsd 2898.34 (227) 1642.96*** (12) 0.65 0.10 0.10 0.00
One factor 4096.26 (230) 2840.88*** (15) 0.49 0.12 0.12 0.00
Seven factorse 699.55 (209) 555.83*** (6) 0.93 0.05 0.05 0.98
Note N = 975. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean residual; RMSEA = root mean square 
error of approximation, 90% confidence interval.
aCommunal sharing, equality matching, market pricing, economic motivation, and sharing citizenship behaviour, and 
willingness to continue participating all load on their respective factors.
bCommunal sharing and equality matching load on one factor, while market pricing, economic motivation, sharing 
citizenship behaviour, and willingness to continue participating all load on their respective factors.
cCommunal sharing and equality matching load on one factor, economic motivation and market pricing load on one 
factor, sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue participating both load on their respective factors.
dCommunal sharing, market pricing and equality matching and economic motivation loading on one factor, our de-
pendent variables sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue participating loading on their respective 
factor.
eOur sharing citizenship behaviour dimension is divided into two factors, conscientiousness and altruism. All other 
variables load on their respective factors.
***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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analysis is the individual respondent to the survey described in the previous subsection 
and we tested our hypotheses via econometric analyses. Specifically, we ran ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions to test our hypotheses on the effects of CS, EM, and MP.4  
For each of our three dependent variables ‒conscientiousness, altruism, and willingness to 
continue participating‒ we tested their effects both individually and simultaneously whilst 
controlling for all the control variables introduced in the previous subsection. Figure 1 
shows our theoretical model, highlighting the hypotheses for which we obtained empir-
ical support and the corresponding effects found.
We report the results of  our empirical analysis using conscientiousness as dependent vari-
able in Table V, while Table VI focuses on altruism and Table VII on willingness to continue 
participating. In each Table, Model 1 includes only the control variables while Models 2 to 
4 test the individual relationships between each of  the three relational models and the de-
pendent variable of  interest excluding the other relational models. Model 5 corresponds 
to our fully-specified model in which all our explanatory variables (i.e. CS, EM, and MP) 
are included together with all the control variables in one single regression model.
Models 2 to 5 in Table V indicate that CS and EM have a positive and significant 
relationship with conscientiousness while there is no significant relationship for MP. 
Specifically, Model 5 shows that the coefficient associated with CS (0.04) is significant 
with a p-value < 0.1 while the one associated with EM is larger (0.20) and significant with 
a p-value < 0.01. A Wald test shows that the difference between the coefficients of  CS 
and EM is significant (F(1, 957) = 19.49, p-value < 0.001). Furthermore, Models 2 to 5 
in Table VI indicate that of  the three relational models only CS is significantly related to 
altruism (b = 0.31, p-value < 0.001). While EM’s coefficient is positive and significant in 
Model 3, its effect loses significance once we consider all three relational models together 
Figure 1. Theoretical model and main findings obtained
Communal sharing 
Equality matching 
Market pricing 
Conscientiousness 
0.04Ώ
0.20** 
0.02 
Communal sharing 
Equality matching 
Market pricing 
Altruism 
0.31*** 
0.06 
0.00 
Communal sharing 
Equality matching 
Market pricing 
Willingness to 
continue participating 
0.11*** 
0.24*** 
-0.06* 
(a) Hypothesized relations and results focusing on sharing citizenship behavior (DV = Conscientiousness)
(b) Hypothesized relations and results focusing on sharing citizenship behavior (DV = Altruism)
(c) Hypothesized relations and results focusing on willingness to continue participating
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in Model 5. Not surprisingly, the difference between the coefficients of  CS and EM is sig-
nificant (F(1, 957) = 19.78, p-value < 0.001). Finally, the results reported in Models 2 to 5 
in Table VII show that CS, EM, and MP are all three significantly related to willingness to 
continue participating, with CS and EM positively and MP negatively related. Computing a 
Wald test reveals that the difference between the coefficients of  CS (0.11) and EM (0.24) 
is significant (F(1, 957) = 4.43, p-value < 0.05). Overall, these results provide partial 
support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. While Hypotheses 1 and 2 propose a stronger effect of  
CS than EM, we only find this stronger effect for altruism, for the two other behavioural 
outcomes we find the opposite. Furthermore, while we hypothesized a negative effect of  
Table V. Relational models and sharing citizenship behaviour (DV = Conscientiousness)
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Conscientiousness Conscientiousness Conscientiousness Conscientiousness Conscientiousness
Independent variables
Communal sharing 0.11*** 0.04†
Equality matching 0.22*** 0.20**
Market pricing 0.01 0.02
Controls
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
Income medium 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04
Income high 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Education lower 0.16** 0.14* 0.13* 0.16** 0.12*
Education professional −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.04
Provider −0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.03 0.02
Prosumer 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06
Peerby 0.18* 0.14† 0.08 0.19 0.10
PeerbyGo 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.09
Thuisafgehaald 0.27** 0.32*** 0.26** 0.26** 0.28***
Membership 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
Frequency 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic motivation 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Constant 5.83*** 5.34*** 4.69*** 5.78*** 4.56***
N. of observations 975 975 975 975 975
Model R2 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.13
Overall F 2.22** 4.62*** 9.47*** 2.09** 8.62***
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.12
Change in R2 
(vs Mod 1)
0.04 0.10 0.00 0.10
†p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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MP, our results only support this hypothesis for willingness to continue participating, and not 
for the two dimensions of  sharing citizenship behaviour, i.e. conscientiousness and altruism.
Additional Analyses
As a post-hoc analysis, we tested for the potential presence of interactions among the 
three relational models. Thus, we reran each of our fully-specified models ‒ i.e., Model 
5 in Tables V, VI, and VII ‒ three times, each time adding a distinct interaction term 
between our key explanatory variables ‒ i.e., MPxCS, MPxEM, CSxEM. In two of the 
nine new models (whose results are illustrated and discussed in the Appendix) we ob-
tained a significant interaction. As an additional post-hoc analysis, we also considered 
whether the presence of a peer-review system interacts with some of our key explan-
atory variables.5  As mentioned in Table I, of the four sampled platforms, Snappcar 
and Thuisafgehaald have a review system while Peerby and PeerbyGo have not. In 
the fully-specified models tested in the main analyses, it was superf luous to include an 
additional control variable distinguishing between platforms with and without review 
system, as this dummy is a linear combination of the dummies for the different plat-
forms that were already included. Having said that, to capture any potential interaction 
between the presence of a review system and the explanatory variables, we reran our 
fully-specified models dropping all platform dummies and including one single dummy 
variable (dummy review), which identifies the two platforms with a review system. In one 
of the nine models tested we obtained a significant interaction, specifically, a positive 
moderating role of dummy review on the negative relationship between MP and conscien-
tiousness (coefficient of the interaction term MPxdummy review = 0.18, p-value < 0.001). To 
visualize this interaction effect, we plotted in Figure 2 the average marginal effects of 
MP on the full range of conscientiousness and calculated these effects when platforms have 
a review system and when they do not (corresponding to a value of 1 and 0 of dummy 
review, respectively). Figure 2 shows that dummy review has a positive moderating effect on 
the underlying relationship between MP and conscientiousness. These results suggest that, 
on the one hand, there is no strong effect of the presence of review systems on the rela-
tionships under scrutiny in our work: in eight of the nine models tested we did not find 
an interaction of the review system. On the other hand, the result visualized in Figure 2 
suggests that the effect of MP on participants’ behaviour may be somewhat sensitive to 
the presence of a peer review system. In interpreting this result, it is important to note 
that our dummy review variable only allows us to group sampled platforms into two differ-
ent groups. Thus, Snappcar and Thuisafgehaald may share some other characteristics 
beyond having a review system that are not captured by our data and are responsible for 
the interaction reported in Figure 2.
To check the robustness of  our findings, we performed additional analyses that are re-
ported in the Appendix and only briefly mentioned here. First, we used statistical meth-
ods to secure the absence of  common method bias as our key variables all use data from 
the same survey. Second, in view of  the fact that the operationalization of  the three 
relational models CS, MP, and EM are all multi-scale items derived from survey respon-
dents, we performed additional analyses to ensure that our measures exhibit adequate 
internal consistency, as well as convergent and discriminant validity. Third, we addressed 
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a potential sample selection bias due to the fact that not all respondents completed the 
survey administered. This is because, if  incomplete surveys are non-random, our re-
sults may be biased due to sample selection. To address this empirical issue, we followed 
common practice and used Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation procedure. The re-
sults we obtained show evidence that our findings do not suffer from sample selection 
bias. Fourth, we addressed the potential endogeneity of  our key explanatory variables, as 
scoring higher/lower on a given relational model may be non-random and could there-
fore bias our results. To test for the presence of  such potential bias, we focused on the 
direct relationship between each of  the three relational models and our three dependent 
variables and, following standard procedure (Bascle, 2008), used a two-stage approach 
Table VI. Relational models and sharing citizenship behaviour (DV = Altruism)
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Altruism Altruism Altruism Altruism Altruism
Independent variables
Communal sharing 0.33*** 0.31***
Equality matching 0.22*** 0.06
Market pricing 0.01 0.00
Controls
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gender −0.13* −0.14* −0.14* −0.12* −0.14*
Income medium −0.06 −0.06 −0.04 −0.07 −0.05
Income high −0.07 −0.09 −0.07 −0.07 −0.09
Education lower 0.33*** 0.27** 0.30** 0.32** 0.27**
Education professional 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09
Provider 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.52***
Prosumer 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.46***
Peerby −0.11 −0.23 −0.21† −0.09 −0.24*
PeerbyGo −0.07 −0.10 −0.11 −0.06 −0.11
Thuisafgehaald 0.04 0.20† 0.03 0.04 0.19†
Membership 0.06* 0.03 0.05† 0.06* 0.03
Frequency 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Economic motivation 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 −0.01
Constant 5.83*** 2.94*** 3.20*** 4.26*** 2.72***
N. of observations 975 975 975 975 975
Model R2 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.20
Overall F 5.01*** 15.30*** 7.76*** 4.69*** 13.67***
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.18
Change in R2 (vs Mod 1) 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.13
†p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
24 N. Stofberg et al. 
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of Managment 
Studies andJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd.
similar to the one used to test for the presence of  a sample selection bias. The results of  
these additional analyses, aimed at addressing potential endogeneity of  the three rela-
tional models, lend additional support to the findings reported in the main analyses.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our work advances both our understanding of peer-to-peer sharing and relational mod-
els theory. To the literature on the sharing economy, our study makes two important 
contributions. First, drawing on organizational citizenship behaviour (e.g., Organ, 1997; 
Organ et al., 2006), we developed a new construct, i.e., sharing citizenship  behaviour, 
that has two dimensions, namely conscientiousness and altruism. Whilst the literature 
had already conceptualized misbehaviour in a sharing context (Schaefers et al., 2016), less 
attention had been paid to conceptualizing prosocial behaviour in this context. Second, 
Table VII. Relational models and willingness to continue participating
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Willingness to 
continue part.
Willingness to 
continue part.
Willingness to 
continue part.
Willingness to 
continue part.
Willingness to 
continue part.
Independent variables
Communal sharing 0.20*** 0.11***
Equality matching 0.30*** 0.24***
Market pricing −0.06* −0.06*
Controls
Age −0.01** −0.01** −0.01** −0.01** −0.01**
Female 0.13* 0.13* 0.12† 0.12† 0.11†
Income medium −0.03 −0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.01
Income high 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08
Education lower 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.04
Education professional 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.01
Provider −0.20* −0.14 −0.15 −0.20* −0.12
Prosumer 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.06
Peerby 0.08 0.01 −0.05 0.00 −0.14
PeerbyGo 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.11
Thuisafgehaald −0.01 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.05
Membership 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Frequency 0.02* 0.01* 0.02* 0.01* 0.01*
Economic motivation 0.06** 0.04* 0.05* 0.07** 0.05*
Constant 5.42*** 4.57*** 3.89*** 5.68*** 3.99***
N. of observations 975 975 975 975 975
Model R2 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.13
Overall F 3.02*** 6.18*** 8.39*** 3.09*** 8.43***
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.12
Change in R2 (vs Mod 1) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.09
†p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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we provided and tested a relational-models view of peer-to-peer sharing, the type of 
sharing relationships that is most threatened by behavioural uncertainty. Our findings 
show that perceiving relationships among participants as governed more strongly by 
CS and EM promotes sharing citizenship behaviour, in the form of conscientiousness 
and altruism, amongst both users and providers, as well as increases willingness to keep 
participating. These results show the value of our more nuanced way of approaching 
participants’ perceptions of relationships on peer-to-peer sharing platforms: there are 
more ways to rouse the behavioural outcomes that contribute to the growth of the shar-
ing economy than would be expected based on the dichotomies used so far to map 
participants’ motivation.
Our findings also offer some empirical support for the expectations formulated in previous 
research that individuals look for relational value, in addition to utilitarian value, when they 
engage in the sharing economy (e.g., Habibi et al., 2016; Hellwig et al., 2015). Specifically, 
our results suggest that participating in the sharing economy can provide at least two forms 
of  relational value: value that comes from belonging to a community (CS), and value that 
comes from transacting with partners who are seen as equal on the basis of  balanced rec-
iprocity (EM). Surprisingly, a strong MP framing of  relationships among participants was 
not found to negatively impact sharing citizenship behaviour, contrary to what we expected. 
While existing literature argues that the impact of  monetary incentives sends sharing from 
the realm of  sharing to that of  business (Belk, 2014; Kouchaki et al., 2013), our study indi-
cates that this is not systematically the case. This lack of  direct negative effect of  MP is in line 
with the work by sharing scholars who have argued that economic and social motivations 
may coexist in a sharing context (Habibi et al., 2016). Yet, our additional analyses regarding 
the interactions among the relational models offer a more nuanced picture: while a strong 
MP frame may not have a direct negative effect on sharing citizenship behaviour, we found 
it to crowd out the positive effect of  a CS frame on conscientiousness.
Our study has important implications for managers of  peer-to-peer sharing plat-
forms. Many managers of  peer-to-peer sharing platforms are currently convinced that, 
Figure 2. Average marginal effect of market pricing on conscientiousness and the interaction with the 
presence of a review system
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if  sharing is to compete with traditional markets, sharing platforms must make sharing 
financially attractive and convenient for providers and users alike (Eckhardt and Bardhi, 
2015). The hassle for participants associated with offline interactions are often believed 
to impair growth (Van de Glind, 2015). Consequently, many sharing platforms are taking 
steps to eliminate personal interactions and emphasize the monetary gains of  peer-to-
peer sharing in their communication towards participants. Our findings call managers 
of  peer-to-peer sharing platforms to reconsider these choices. Sharing in the form of  
renting without personal interactions is likely to weaken an EM and CS representation 
of  relationships and strengthen an MP one because it makes sharing not about helping 
others or making human connections, but about ‘dividing a resource among separate 
entities’ (Belk, 2010, p. 727). The rise in participants’ misbehaviour that Turo ‒ a U.S.-
based peer-to-peer car sharing platform (formerly known as RelayRides) ‒ experienced 
when transitioning from a personal to a convenient renting model provides anecdotal 
evidence in support of  our expectations of  a negative impact associated with weakening 
the EM and CS frame. In 2012 the sharing platform entered into a partnership with 
General Motors to install their Onstar system, a tool that allows people to unlock cars 
via an app, hereby removing the need for members of  the platform to meet in person. 
Whilst this seemed a great idea, in practice it led to an erosion of  accountability and a 
stark increase in participants’ disputes (Lawler, 2013; Van de Glind, 2015). In the face of  
these problems, in 2013 the platform reverted back to its old system, in which owners and 
renters meet face to face to hand over the car key.
Rather than eliminating personal interactions and emphasizing monetary gains, we 
recommend developing platform features and launching initiatives that trigger partic-
ipants to construe sharing relationships in terms of  CS or EM, as these mental frames 
foster the willingness to continue participating and sharing citizenship behaviour. Our 
present study did not include the antecedents of  the relational models. We therefore can 
only speculate about which platform features and initiatives would be most appropriate 
and more research is needed in this area. We expect that the presence of  a peer-review 
system may help prompt an EM frame because such a system increases the possibility 
for indirect reciprocity among strangers (Einav et al., 2016; Kuwabara, 2015). For some 
platforms, a digital scoreboard tracking how active members are on a platform could 
further this goal too. Informal talks with Peerby brought to light that their challenge is 
not getting members to share but rather to stimulate users to ask their local community 
for goods more than once. Members of  Peerby are uncomfortable to make frequent 
requests as they feel this makes the relationship unbalanced. A score count showing that 
participants’ asks and shares are in balance could therefore help foster feelings of  bal-
anced reciprocity. We expect that a CS frame can be strengthened by initiatives that 
aim at community building and inspiring both online as well as offline interactions. For 
example, Thuisafgehaald (2018) successfully launched an initiative in which home cooks 
go the extra mile by providing people with disabilities, who live in their community, with 
a home-cooked meal that they prepare at their homes. Organizing local offline events 
such as meet and greets between participants, workshops around common themes, or a 
neighbourhood get-together should also help foster a sense of  community and cohesion.
Our work also advances relational models theory. On the one hand, our work con-
tributes to the so far very limited body of  empirical research applying relational models 
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theory to management topics. While the number of  theory papers building on relational 
models theory indicates an interest of  management scholars for this theory (e.g., Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst, 2016; Giessner and Van Quaquebeke, 2010; Mossholder et al., 2011), 
few management scholars have applied it in empirical research (exceptions are Boer et al. 
(2011) and Keck et al. (2018)). Our results strongly support using relational models the-
ory over the simpler dichotomy ‘community/clan’ vs. ‘market’ that is usually used to de-
scribe relationships in management research (e.g., Poppo et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009). 
It is EM, the model that is not considered when adopting a simple dichotomy, that has 
the strongest effects for two of  the three types of  behaviour we considered in the context 
of  peer-to-peer sharing facilitated by online-based platforms (namely, conscientiousness 
and willingness to continue participating).
On the other hand, our mixed support for our main effects calls for a much more 
nuanced theorizing of  the effects of  the relational models on different types of  cooper-
ative behaviour. Cooperative behaviour encompasses our three dependent variables; it 
is generally seen as behaviour that benefits collective value creation and includes proso-
cial behaviour and joining or leaving the collective (Bosse and Coughlan, 2016). While, 
following Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016), we proposed that MP would be detrimental to 
cooperative behaviour and that CS would have a stronger positive impact than EM on 
all types of  cooperative behaviour, we did not find a detrimental effect of  MP and found 
a stronger effect of  EM for two out of  our three dependent variables.
These findings thus indicate a need to develop a typology of  cooperative behaviour 
in order to be able to better understand the relational antecedents of  different types of  
cooperative behaviour. With only three types of  cooperative behaviour, we have limited 
material to suggest dimensions along which to build this typology. However, our three 
types seem to differ in terms of  how personally costly and beneficial the behaviour is: 
while altruism (which covers, inter alia, adapting one’s schedule to cater to other mem-
bers, being always willing to help others on the platform) is costlier than personally bene-
ficial, it is less clearly the case for our two types. In particular, one could be conscientious 
(which includes, inter alia, avoiding causing trouble for other members, being always on 
time for appointments with other members) without incurring high costs. Along the same 
line, participation could bring more benefits than costs for providers when sharing is for a 
fee and for users regardless of  whether they access the good for free or for a fee.
We suggest further areas for follow-up research, in relation to the limitations of  our 
study. First, we acknowledge that our work is limited by the nature of  our sample and 
scope of  the study. Given that we relied on the sharing platforms to administer our 
survey and lack information about the people who did not start answering our question-
naire, we cannot be completely confident that our sample is not biased. In addition, our 
sample is limited to participants located in the Netherlands of  four sharing platforms 
on which combinations of  physical goods and services are exchanged. Future research 
should replicate our study with a larger number of  platforms across multiple countries 
and with platforms on which pure services are exchanged (e.g., cleaning, handyman ser-
vices, consulting).
When including more platforms, scholars could also investigate which platform features 
influence how relationships among participants are framed. In particular, our relatively 
crude post-hoc analysis for the effect of  a peer-review system (cf. Appendix) suggests 
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studying further the impact of  different reputation systems on how participants frame 
relationships on a peer-to-peer sharing platform. Features such as rating systems aim to 
reduce uncertainty about others’ opportunism by providing information about their past 
behaviour (Dreyer et al., 2017; Frenken and Schor, 2017; Kuwabara, 2015). Yet, looking 
at these features from the point of  view of  relational models theory, one can question 
whether such features only have the positive effect of  reducing uncertainty, or whether 
they may also reduce the strength of  a CS frame in favour of  an EM or MP frame.
Second, although our results suggest that perceptions of  relationships among partici-
pants in general relate to sharing citizenship behaviour and willingness to continue partic-
ipating, a limitation is that our research did not account for repeated interactions among 
participants, because we did not collect information about the frequency of  repeated in-
teractions. If  individuals interact regularly with the same other participants (e.g., always 
lending a car to the same neighbours), these other participants will cease to be ‘strangers’ 
to whom generic mental schemes are applied, and instead become relational partners to 
whom relational models grounded in personal experience are applied. Consequently, re-
peated interactions add explanatory factors linked to the interaction level – another level 
of  analysis than the individual level that we studied. Research adopting a social network 
perspective to study prosocial behaviour suggests that such behaviour may be affected by 
the strength of  (dyadic) relational ties (Simpson and Willer, 2015). For example, Bowler 
and Brass (2006) have shown that interpersonal friendship triggers altruistic behaviour 
among employees. On platforms where exchanges are usually repeated, participants’ be-
haviour may thus be less well explained by the generic relational models at the platform 
level than is the case for the platforms we studied. We recommend that future research 
systematically asks respondents to report not only how they see the relationships among 
participants in general but also how they perceive their own relationships with other par-
ticipants and the extent to which they engage in repeated interactions. It would allow to 
investigate whether respondents’ perceptions of  relationships among participants in gen-
eral are biased by their own repeated interactions with some specific other participants.
Third, a variable that was not examined in our study, but that would further deepen 
the understanding of  peer-to-peer sharing relationships, is the nature and degree of  per-
ceived interdependence with other participants. In the context of  peer-to-peer sharing, 
perceived interdependence would capture the degree to which individuals expect their 
outcomes to be positively or negatively affected by other participants’ behaviour. We 
expect the degree of  perceived interdependence to differ across sharing platforms because 
the type of  goods shared, the benefits participants receive from sharing, and the severity 
of  the consequences of  others’ misbehaviour may vary across platforms. Future studies 
could therefore integrate interdependence into our model and explore how the degree 
of  perceived (positive or negative) interdependence affects the impact of  the relational 
models on participants’ behaviour. In particular, the absence of  a relationship between 
an MP frame and the behavioural outcomes in our study could hide two opposing effects: 
a negative relationship in case of  high interdependence, which brings the need for pro- 
sociality, and a positive relationship in case of  low interdependence, where pro-sociality 
is less important and MP can deliver the benefits of  competition (with regard to quality 
and price) and the pursuit of  the efficiency linked to self-interest.
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To conclude, to management scholars, our research provides empirical evidence that 
sharing citizenship behaviour is not exclusively driven by material self-interest. On the 
contrary, our findings regarding the importance of  relational benefits show the value of  a 
relational-models approach, rather than a transactional approach, to further the growth 
of  peer-to-peer sharing. To managers who are currently steering their sharing platforms 
into the direction of  convenience and price to the detriment of  personal connections, our 
results suggest that this might not be the best move: their platforms may well be better 
served by creating feelings of  community or reciprocity.
NOTES
 [1] In line with the literature (Belk, 2014; Botsman and Rogers, 2010), the platforms we studied offer a 
‘product service system’, as participants on these platforms provide/receive a combination of physi-
cal goods and services. For example, a product-service combination is exchanged on Snappcar: the 
owner provides a physical good (the car) together with a service (e.g. providing temporary access to 
the car, cleaning the car and checking its correct functioning before the user gets access to it, etc.).
 [2] Authority ranking shares similarities with Williamson’s (1975) hierarchy. ‘Authority ranking is a 
relationship of asymmetric differences, commonly exhibited in a hierarchical ordering of statuses 
and precedence, often accompanied by the exercise of command and complementary displays of 
deference and respect’ (Fiske, 1991, p. ix). Since our work centres on peer-to-peer sharing, where par-
ticipants do not differ much in power or status, the authority ranking relational model that involves 
hierarchical ordering is not relevant for our study. We thus excluded this relational model from our 
study, similarly to Mossholder et al. (2011) who did not consider authority ranking in their theorizing 
about helping behaviour among colleagues at the same hierarchical level.
 [3] While reciprocity has often been discussed as an important driver of market relationships, it is im-
portant to note that balanced reciprocity is more than Trivers’ (1971) reciprocal altruism. Reciprocal 
altruism is self-interested and future-oriented. It rests on the expectations of future material benefits 
from cooperation, for example, because one expects to be rewarded for cooperation when interact-
ing again with the same partner in the future or when interacting with others who will be aware of 
one’s past cooperative behaviour. In contrast, balanced reciprocity is backward-looking as well as 
future-oriented: past favours are paid back even if there is no expectation of a common future (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2002).
 [4] We checked whether there were significant between-group effects at the platform level. As we found 
no significant between-group effects at the platform level, we proceeded with regression analysis at 
the individual level.
 [5] We thank our reviewers for suggesting that it would be interesting to look at the interactions among 
the relational models and at the effect of a review system.
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APPENDIX 
P OST- HOC A NA LYSIS
In what follows we tested for the potential presence of interactions among the three relational models. To 
do so, as mentioned in the article, we reran each of our fully-specified models ‒ i.e., Model 5 in Tables 
V, VI, and VII ‒ three times, each time adding a distinct interaction term between our key explanatory 
variables ‒ i.e., MPxCS, MPxEM, CSxEM. In two of the nine new models we obtained a significant inter-
action, specifically, a negative moderating role of MP on the positive relationship between CS and conscien-
tiousness (Coeff. of the interaction term MPxCS = −0.02, p-value < 0.1) and a positive interaction between 
CS and EM on conscientiousness (Coeff. of the interaction term CSxEM = 0.04, p-value < 0.01). To visualize 
these interactions effects, we plotted the results obtained in Figures A1 and A2. Specifically, in Figure A1 
we plotted the average marginal effects of CS on the full range of conscientiousness and calculated these 
effects at −1 and +1 standard deviations of MP (corresponding to a low and a high level of MP, respec-
tively). Figure A1 shows that MP has a negative moderating effect on the underlying relationship between 
CS and conscientiousness. Figure A2 shows the positive moderating effect of CS on the underlying relation-
ship between EM and conscientiousness, when plotting the average marginal effects of EM on the full range 
of conscientiousness and calculating these effects at −1 and +1 standard deviations of CS (corresponding to a 
low and a high level of CS, respectively).
Figure A1. Average marginal effect of communal sharing on conscientiousness and the interaction with 
market pricing
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These interactions make sense if we consider that in many social situations, individuals experience a 
tension between collective and self-interest. In the face of this tension, an individual motivated to maintain 
his/her self-image and social standing will only violate a social norm if there is a credible opportunity 
to claim an exemption from the norm, which resolves the moral dilemma linked to the violation in the 
individual’s mind and (the individual hopes) in the mind of the members of the audience to whom the 
individual feels accountable (Blasi, 1983; Sykes and Matza, 1957). The presence of a strong market pric-
ing frame likely provides individuals with a credible opportunity to justify an exemption from the norm 
of altruism linked to communal sharing. Justifications are a common way to claim an exemption: with 
a justification, the individuals accept responsibility for the action but deny the negative value associated 
with it by others (Scott and Lyman, 1968). We can similarly explain why communal sharing and equality 
matching strengthen each other’s effects on conscientiousness. As exhibiting sharing citizenship behav-
iour is the normatively appropriate behaviour in both relational models, together the models make being 
conscientious more salient among the set of behavioural alternatives and reduce the room individuals have 
for justifying self-interested behaviour as a legitimate exemption. 
ROBUST N E S S CH ECK S
As a first robustness check, we secured the absence of common method bias using statistical methods to 
determine the probability of such bias (Podsakof et al., 2003). The major concern relates to our key vari-
ables as they all use data from the same survey. To determine whether our data is likely to suffer from com-
mon method bias in relation to these variables, we performed the Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003) and thus ran an exploratory factor analysis on the relevant items as listed in Table II in order to 
establish the number of factors that are required to account for the variance in the variables. Focusing on 
all the items used to build our three explanatory variables MP, EM, and CS, the analysis indicated three 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, therefore confirming the lack of unidimensionality in our data. 
Second, in view of  the fact that the operationalization of  the three relational models CS, MP, and EM are 
all multi-scale items derived from survey respondents, we performed additional analyses to ensure that our 
measures exhibit adequate internal consistency, as well as convergent and discriminant validity. We grounded 
our assessment of  internal consistency (composite reliability) on Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) measure. The 
results obtained indicate that the measures for internal consistency for MP (0.80), EM (0.78), and CS (0.81) 
are all greater than the 0.70 threshold that is required to establish internal consistency (Nunnally and Bern-
stein, 1994). In relation to convergent validity, we computed Fornell and Larcker’s average variance extracted 
(AVE) measure for MP (0.57), EM (0.55), and CS (0.58). Our findings showed that all AVEs surpassed the 
0.50 cut-off  necessary for the AVE to confirm a satisfactory level of  convergent validity. We also followed 
Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) method to assess discriminant validity. The square roots of  the AVE for MP 
(0.76), EM (0.74), and CS (0.76) are all greater than the correlations between each of  the latent construct 
Figure A2. Average marginal effect of equality matching on conscientiousness and the interaction with 
communal sharing
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pairings. Additionally, the square root of  the AVE for each of  three relational models is also greater than 
the correlation between each latent construct and every other variable considered in the analysis. This offers 
additional evidence in support of  the discriminant validity of  the three latent constructs used in our analyses 
(Hair et al., 2006). 
Third, we addressed a potential sample selection bias due to the fact that not all respondents completed 
the survey. If  incomplete surveys are non-random, our empirical results may be biased due to sample selec-
tion. To address this empirical issue, we followed common practice and used Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
estimation procedure. In the first stage, we used as dependent variable a dummy that specified whether the 
respondent completed the survey in its entirety and thus allowed for its inclusion in the final working sample 
(dummy complete survey). As our main exclusion variable we used a dummy that scored 1 when the respondent’s 
income corresponds to the lowest possible category and 0 otherwise (dummy low income), as this is positively 
related to the likelihood that the respondent completes the survey (r = 0.33), while not related to any of  the 
three behavioural outcomes conscientiousness (r = 0.03), altruism (r = 0.05), and willingness to continue participating 
(r = 0.03), thus satisfying the exclusion restriction of  Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation procedure. In 
the first stage we used as explanatory variables the set of  control variables listed in Model 1 in Table V for 
which we had gathered most responses corresponding to age, specific platform used, and type of  partici-
pation (provider, user, or prosumer). In the second stage we used the same set of  explanatory variables and 
added our measures of  the three relational models CS, EM, and MP as well as the vector of  inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) from the selection equation model estimated in the first stage. We repeated this two-stage esti-
mation procedure three times, each time focusing on a different dependent variable in the second stage—i.e. 
conscientiousness, altruism, and willingness to continue participating. The results obtained are entirely aligned with 
the ones obtained without this correction (i.e. the ones reported in Model 5 in Tables V, VI, and VII) with 
the coefficient of  IMR not significant in any of  the three second stage model specifications, thus providing 
empirical evidence that our findings do not suffer from sample selection bias. 
Fourth, we addressed the potential endogeneity of  our key explanatory variables, as scoring higher/lower 
on a given relational model may be non-random and could therefore bias our results. To test for the presence 
of  such potential bias, we focused on the direct relationship between each of  the three relational models and 
our three dependent variables and used a two-stage approach similar to the one used to test for the pres-
ence of  a sample selection bias (Bascle, 2008) (cf. also Certo et al. (2016) and Wooldridge (2010)). Starting 
with CS, in the first stage, we estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable is the propensity to 
display a high level of  CS using a dummy that scores 1 if  the respondent’s measure of  CS is higher than the 
average and 0 otherwise (CS dummy). The set of  explanatory variables in this first-stage model corresponds 
to the variables gathered through our survey that one may theoretically argue to have an effect on a given 
respondent’s level of  CS, i.e., age, gender, education and income levels. As exclusion variable we gathered 
additional data based on the area in which each respondent resided at the time of  completion of  the survey 
(we had asked respondents for their postal code) and used the percentage of  kids younger than 5 years old in 
the corresponding province (percentage of  young kids) reported by the Dutch Central Bureau of  Statistics (CBS, 
2016). This is a relevant and appropriate instrument because a higher percentage of  young kids should 
prime the adult population to use the relational frame that is most typical of  family, namely CS (Fiske, 1991). 
Methodologically, percentage of  young kids satisfies the exclusion restriction as it is positively related to CS dummy 
while not related to any of  the three dependent variables used in our study—conscientiousness, altruism, and 
willingness to continue participating. 
From the first stage we computed the inverse mills ratio (IMR) and used it as a control variable in the 
second stage in order to obtain consistent and unbiased coefficients. In the second stage, we ran an OLS 
regression with conscientiousness as our dependent variable and CS dummy as the main explanatory variable to-
gether with all the other explanatory variables included in the first stage. The results we obtained are entirely 
aligned with the ones obtained without this correction (which also correspond to the ones reported in Model 
2 in Table V in the main analysis). Moreover, the coefficient associated with IMR is not significant. This is 
an important finding as the lack of  any statistical significance of  this coefficient corroborates the notion that 
the potential endogeneity associated with reporting a high versus low level of  CS does not affect our results 
related to the relationship between CS and conscientiousness. We repeated this two-stage estimation procedure 
twice, using as dependent variable in the second stage first altruism and then willingness to continue participating. 
In both cases, the results obtained are entirely aligned with the ones obtained without this correction and the 
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coefficient associated with IMR was never significant, thus further corroborating the notion that the potential 
endogeneity of  CS does not affect our main results. 
To address the potential endogeneity of  the other two relational models, EM and MP, we followed the 
same approach adopted for CS and used the same exclusion variable for EM and MP, as we tested for the 
potential endogeneity of  these two constructs separately. The instrument we used is CBS’ data on the num-
ber of  people with psychological trouble/ household violence/ homeless people in the municipality in which 
the respondent resided at the time of  completion of  the survey (number of  homeless people (CBS Statline, 2018)). 
Methodologically, number of  homeless people satisfies the exclusion criteria as it has a significant and positive 
correlation with MP dummy, a negative and significant correlation with EM dummy (both MP dummy and EM 
dummy were built following the same logic used to construct CS dummy), while it is not significantly correlated 
with any of  our three dependent variables. Theoretically, it appears to be a valid instrument as we can expect 
a higher number of  people with psychological trouble, more household violence, and a higher number of  
homeless people to be linked to more social distance among the inhabitants of  a municipality, which char-
acterizes MP, and less social control, which characterizes EM (Fiske, 1991). The two-stage estimation proce-
dure confirms the same relationships between MP dummy and EM dummy and the three dependent variables 
as reported in the main analyses (i.e., Models 3 and 4 in Tables V, VI, and VII), with the coefficient associated 
with IMR not significant in any of  the specifications used. Thus, these additional model specifications aimed 
at addressing potential endogeneity of  the three relational models lend additional support to our findings 
reported in the main analyses. 
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